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SYMPOSIUM—PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE 
ERA OF #BLACKLIVESMATTER 
Harris Freeman* 
FOREWORD—POLICE MISCONDUCT AND KIBBE V. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD 
The Law Review’s 2017 symposium, “Perspectives on Racial 
Justice in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter,” appropriately opened with 
a panel that addressed the ongoing challenge of combatting police 
misconduct, as seen through the lens of Kibbe v. City of Springfield,1 a 
civil rights case that unfolded in Western Massachusetts and 
reached the United States Supreme Court thirty years ago.  Kibbe 
presented the Court with the question of what the proper standard 
of liability should be for a municipality accused of a civil rights 
violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequately training a police 
officer who violates a person’s civil rights.2 
The legal issue first presented to the Court in Kibbe remains 
timely.  It sits at the root of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) 
movement’s argument that the federal courts have proven incapable 
of addressing a constant stream of racially driven assaults and 
killings by police officers against Black individuals.3  BLM’s 
viewpoint continues to resonate, sparking demonstrations and a 
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1.  See generally City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987). 
2.  Id. at 258. 
3.  See generally Bridgette Baldwin, Black, White, and Blue: Bias, Profiling, and 
Policing in the Age of Black Lives Matter, 40 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 431 (2018). 
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public outcry each time these assaults occur and the legal system 
fails to hold police and municipal governments legally accountable 
for the deaths and brutal treatment of Black and Brown victims of 
state-sponsored violence.4  This reality highlights what is widely 
criticized as a problematic standard of liability governing these civil 
rights disputes, particularly because there has been a plethora of 
eyewitness accounts of police misconduct and a stunning number of 
citizens who have video-recorded these incidents on their cell 
phones.5 
The Kibbe panel featured the attorneys who litigated Kibbe, 
Terry Nagel and Edward Pikula, both alumni of the Western New 
England University School of Law (WNEU).  Attorney Nagel 
represented the civil rights claimant, and Attorney Pikula 
represented the City of Springfield and its police officer defendants.  
Terry Nagel is currently senior staff counsel for the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services.  Ed Pikula is city solicitor for the City of 
Springfield.  When they argued the case at the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Terry and Ed were only three to five years out of law school. 
The panel concluded with a presentation by Dr. Bridgette 
Baldwin, a WNEU Law faculty member, who focused on the 
disturbing social roots of police misconduct in America and the 
resulting rash of killings of African Americans by police officers that 
has given rise to BLM.6 
Kibbe falls within a line of cases that reached the Supreme Court 
in the wake of the historic civil rights movement of the last century.  
Civil rights organizations sought to breathe life into 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
the post-Civil War statute enacted in 1871 during Reconstruction to 
provide a remedy for government-sponsored Ku Klux Klan violence 
against African Americans and to provide a means of enforcing the 
newly enacted Amendments to the U.S. Constitution that ended 
slavery and established equal rights for African Americans.7  Section 
1983 remained dormant and without judicial sanction until 1961 
when the Court decided Monroe v. Pape,8 the historic ruling that 
 
4.  Id. at 433–37. 
5.  Id. at 439. 
6.  Dr. Baldwin’s symposium contribution can be found in this Issue, Bridgette 
Baldwin, Black, White, and Blue: Bias, Profiling, and Policing in the Age of Black Lives 
Matter, 40 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 431 (2018). 
7.  Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 1 (Oct. 
20, 2017) (on file with author). 
8.  See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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Chicago police officers violated the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments when they engaged in a warrantless invasion of the 
home of an African American family, purportedly seeking a suspect 
in a murder investigation.  The police forced the parents to stand 
naked in front of their four children as they ransacked the house.9  It 
turned out the police were mistaken; no one in that house was under 
suspicion. 
This was a watershed moment; Monroe was the first time that 
§ 1983 was used to hold police civilly liable for civil rights violations.  
However, the Supreme Court dismissed the claims in the case 
brought against the City of Chicago, finding that the City was not a 
“person” under this Civil Rights Act.10  The dismissal of the municipal 
claims significantly curtailed the remedial impact of § 1983, 
shielding municipal coffers from the reach of successful civil rights 
litigants. 
It took civil rights lawyers and their clients another seventeen 
years to reverse Monroe and persuade the Court that a municipality 
is a “person” that can be compelled to pay monetary damages for 
violations of constitutional rights.11  Ed Pikula stressed, however, 
that Monell did not establish an automatic windfall for civil rights 
litigants every time it was proven that a police officer engaged in a 
civil rights violation: “the Court said the city is a person but it can’t 
be held liable just on the basis of respondeat superior.”12  The fact 
that a city employs the police officers “is not enough, you need to 
prove that the city itself caused this violation . . . .”13 
Kibbe was a wrongful death case involving a botched police 
chase of a suspect.  In 1981, when Terry Nagle filed Kibbe as a 
§ 1983 case in the Massachusetts federal district court in Springfield, 
three things about the scope of municipal liability under § 1983 
were evident on the facts of the case.  First, that the City of 
Springfield had exposure under Monell for the allegations of 
constitutional violations alleged by the plaintiff if it could be proven 
at trial that the violation resulted from the municipality’s custom or 
 
9.  Id. at 169. 
10.  Id. at 191. 
11.  See generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
12.  Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 2 
(Oct. 20, 2017) (on file with author). 
13.  Id. 
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policy.14  Second, as Ed and Terry both pointed out, the allegations of 
police misconduct were bolstered by evidence that the Springfield 
police were not properly trained in carrying out police chases of a 
suspect.  Third, that the standard of liability to be imposed on the 
municipal defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was definitely not one of 
respondeat superior; but what the correct standard should be—
negligence, recklessness of some kind, or something like deliberate 
indifference—was not a settled question of law. 
Terry Nagel was handed a compelling set of facts in Kibbe.  He 
used them to present the proposition that a municipality should be 
liable under the Monell standard if it could be proven that the police 
misconduct at issue was caused by a custom or policy of 
inadequately training its police officers to engage in a police chase of 
a suspect. 
Indeed, in Kibbe, the victim, Clinton Thurston, died from a 
police-fired bullet to his brain, fired during his attempt to evade 
arrest in the course of a “low-speed chase, not unlike O.J. Simpson’s, 
never over 45 miles per hour.”15  It all began with a 911 call.  
Thurston had violated a restraining order requiring him to stay 
away from his girlfriend, Pamela Etter.16  It was reported that 
Thurston had abducted Etter and was proceeding by car to Lois 
Thurston Kibbe’s house; she was Thurston’s sister and became the 
administrator of Thurston’s estate and the plaintiff in the case. 
The ensuing chase involved police cruisers, ineptly executed 
roadblocks, and ultimately an officer on a motorcycle that fired the 
fatal shot through Thurston’s car window.  As Ed Pikula explained, 
Thurston drove past an initial roadblock at about twenty-five miles 
per hour; the officers were brandishing guns and one fired at 
Thurston’s car.17  Testimony at trial indicates that police were 
allowed to use firearms to affect an arrest if an officer reasonably 
believed that the crime in question included the use of deadly force.  
Under these rules, Ed Pikula argued that the vehicle Thurston was 
driving could have been considered a deadly weapon.18  A second 
 
14.  Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 
15.  Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 5 
(Oct. 20, 2017) (on file with author). 
16.  Brief for Respondent at 2, City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1986) (No. 
85-1217), 1986 WL 728319, at *2. 
17.  Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 1 
(Oct. 20, 2017) (on file with author). 
18.  Id. 
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roadblock—with a police vehicle blocking the right-hand lane and 
an officer standing in the middle of the three other lanes waving his 
hands to flag down Thurston—was also ineffective at halting 
Thurston.  The City claimed that Thurston swerved toward the 
officer.  At that point, the City argued a shoot to kill approach was 
warranted. 
Next, a motorcycle officer, Theodore Perry, accelerated past the 
police cruisers and drove alongside the driver’s side of Thurston’s 
car.  Perry did not hear instructions that motorcycled officers should 
stay out of the pursuit.  After attempts to engage Thurston, when 
Thurston’s vehicle swerved toward Perry, the officer fired shots.  
The first went through a window of a house; the second struck 
Thurston in the brain.  His car rolled to a stop two houses from his 
sister’s residence.19  An officer ordered Thurston out of the car; he 
was unresponsive.  Nevertheless, an officer struck Thurston on the 
head with a flashlight, dragged him out of the car, and handcuffed 
him face down.  Perry failed to report that he shot Thurston and the 
officers involved in Thurston’s transport to the hospital were not 
told that Thurston was shot.20  He was pronounced dead at the 
hospital. 
Former Springfield mayor and then district court judge, Frank 
Freedman oversaw the Kibbe trial.  Only Officer Perry, who shot and 
killed Thurston, but not the other three officers on trial, was found 
to have violated Thurston’s civil rights.  The jury awarded one dollar 
in compensatory damages and $500 in punitive damages chargeable 
to Thurston.  But the jury found the City of Springfield violated 
Thurston’s civil rights and awarded his estate $50,000.  The City 
appealed the verdict. 
Nagel’s argument from the beginning of the case was that the 
City was liable for Thurston’s death due to inadequate training of its 
officers under a gross negligence standard.21  Nagel persuaded the 
jury that the City’s policy itself did not have to command a civil 
rights violation, “[W]e were talking about city training that was 
inadequate and the way that you could tell was that every policeman 
involved . . . operated in a ‘keystone cops’ kind of approach to the 
stop, resulting in” Thurston’s death.22  “[T]he only way this could 
 
19.  Id. at 5. 
20.  Id. at 2. 
21.  Id. at 6. 
22.  Id. 
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have happened was if they weren’t trained on how to do stops.”23  
Under this theory, Nagel’s argument avoided the result required by 
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, which overturned a $1.5 million judgment 
against the city because the jury inferred § 1983 liability based on 
inadequate training or supervision “solely” from a “‘single incident’ 
of police misconduct . . . standing alone.”24 
The First Circuit did not disagree and wrote an extensive 
analysis to distinguish the factual grounds for the jury’s ruling from 
the facts in Tuttle.25  Although it considered Kibbe a “close case,” the 
appeals court concluded that it was “unable to say that no jury could 
find that the City was grossly negligent in failing to train its officers, 
causing their use of excessive force against Clinton Thurston.”26  
Relying on this holding, at the Supreme Court Nagel argued gross 
negligence in police training was evident, not from a single incident 
of excessive force, but rather from the ineffective police roadblocks 
and parade of police vehicles chasing Thurston, and the improper 
use of firearms against an unarmed civilian that amounted to a “Clint 
Eastwood approach to the use of deadly force.”27 
The crux of the City’s argument to the Supreme Court was based 
on Pikula’s post-trial motion for a directed verdict,28 in which he 
argued that imposing any variant of a negligence standard to the 
City was contrary to the holding in Monell; “you need recklessness or 
something like deliberate indifference”29—certainly more than gross 
 
23.  Id. 
24.  Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 805 (1st Cir. 1985); see also 
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985). 
25.  See Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 805–06. 
26.  Id. at 807.  The court further explained:  
Here, in an admittedly close case, the evidence consisted principally of: (1) 
testimony that there was but little guidance for undertaking an automobile 
chase; (2) testimony, contrary to that of the officers, that Thurston was not 
posing a life-threatening hazard to them; (3) a department rule on the use of 
firearms which in part required preliminary resort to less severe alternatives, 
arguably ignored by the officers; (4) another part of the rule which 
proscribed firing where there was substantial danger to innocent people, 
arguably violated by two officers; (5) a dispatcher’s arguably overzealous 
announcement on police radio; and (6) evidence of looseness in investigating 
shootings. 
Id. at 804. 
27.  Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 6 (on 
file with author). 
28.  Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 806. 
29.  Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 3  
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negligence—to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for civil 
rights violations resulting from a failure to properly train police.  He 
also appealed on the ground that the jury instructions “failed to 
indicate that liability against the City could not be predicated on an 
isolated incident of negligent training, but must instead be based on 
‘a pattern of deliberate supervisory inaction and indifference.’”30 
These issues were fully briefed and argued after the Court 
granted certiorari.31  Nagel also presented a procedural argument to 
the Court that proved dispositive.  He contended that certiorari was 
improvidently granted because the City had failed to object to the 
jury instructions on gross negligence that it was challenging on 
appeal. 
The Kibbe case attracted the attention of leading civil rights and 
civil liberties organizations.  The American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) of Massachusetts filed an amicus brief supporting Thurston’s 
estate.32  The ACLU brief, written by Marjorie Hines, later appointed 
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, argued that the proper 
standard for police misconduct of the sort at issue in the case was 
gross negligence.  Hines also backed Nagel’s argument that the case 
should be dismissed because Springfield failed to object to the jury 
instructions it was challenging on further appellate review.33  The 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) also filed an amicus brief authored by then-WNEU Law 
Professor John Egnal.34  The NAACP argued that the Court should 
reverse Monell and reject the requirement that a § 1983 violation be 
premised on a finding of a municipal policy or custom; the nation’s 
oldest civil rights organization further argued that the proper 
standard for municipal liability should be respondeat superior.35 
 
(Oct. 20, 2017) (on file with author). 
30.  Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 809. 
31.  See generally City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986). 
32.  See generally Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and The Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, City of 
Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1967) (No. 85-1217), 1985 WL 670242. 
33.  Id. at 7. 
34.  See generally Brief for the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 
480 U.S. 257 (1967) (No. 85-1217), 1986 WL 728323. 
35.  The amicus brief filed by the NAACP contended, 
[N]either the legislative history of section 1983 nor considerations of policy 
dictate a rule that requires proof of a government policy or custom in order to 
establish municipal liability.  In this regard, we urge the Court to review its  
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The First Circuit’s ruling upholding the jury verdict for Kibbe 
effectively ended the case.  The Court never reached the merits of 
the negligence issue presented in Kibbe.  By a five-four vote, the 
Court agreed with Nagel’s argument and found that the City’s failure 
to object at trial to the jury instruction on gross negligence was 
grounds to dismiss the case, finding that certiorari was 
improvidently granted.36  However, Justice O’Connor’s dissent 
portended what was to become the standard for municipal liability 
in § 1983 claims. 
Addressing the merits of the City’s argument, Justice O’Connor 
wrote the following in the dissent she authored: 
Because of the remote causal connection between omissions in a 
police training program and affirmative misconduct by individual 
officers in a particular instance, in my view the “inadequacy” of 
police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only 
where the failure to train amounts to a reckless disregard for or 
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons within the city’s 
domain.37 
The next term, in Canton v. Harris, Justice White, mirroring the 
language of Justice O’Connor’s dissent and writing for the majority, 
held that “[t]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis 
for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train . . . amounts to 
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with 
whom the police come into contact.”38 
The majority’s decision in Kibbe candidly recognized the 
troubling legal foundation for the Court’s holding, noting that the 
“inquiry” as to “whether there is a direct causal link between a 
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional 
deprivation” is a “difficult one; one that has left this Court deeply 
divided in a series of cases that have followed Monell.”39  The Harris 
Court’s adoption of a deliberate indifference standard to establish 
municipal liability for failure to properly train a police force did 
overcome the divisions on the Court; the part of Justice White’s 
opinion that established the deliberate indifference standard 
 
earlier pronouncements on this issue, and adopt the respondeat superior 
theory as the standard of proof in section 1983 cases. 
Id. at 4. 
36.  Kibbe, 480 U.S. at 264. 
37.  Id. at 268–69 (O’Connor dissenting) (emphasis added). 
38.  Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 
39.  Id. at 385–86. 
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secured nine votes.40 
Going forward, the Court’s standard for municipal liability under 
§ 1983 for a municipality’s failure to train and supervise police has 
provided a consistently strong shield protecting cities and towns 
from the financial consequences of countless instances of police 
misconduct.  As Terry Nagel explained, the trajectory of the Court’s 
§ 1983 jurisprudence—beginning with Justice O’Connor’s prescient 
dissent in Kibbe—was to weaken this critical statute whose purpose 
was to end institutionalized state violence motivated by a racial 
animus.  Three decades after Kibbe, Terry Nagel’s observation is all 
too evident in Springfield, one of many cities where, at this time, the 
pattern of police misconduct decried by the BLM movement appears 
to be intractable. 
The publication of this volume of the WNE Law Review occurs as 
public scrutiny of the Springfield police is underway.  There is 
renewed attention to dozens of civil rights lawsuits, hundreds of 
citizen complaints and now a U.S. Justice Department investigation is 
inquiring into what the Boston-based Lawyers Committee for Civil 
Rights and Economic Justice calls an “absence of any sort of 
accountability” for the Springfield police force.41  The alleged 
misconduct ranges from prisoner beatings and use of racial slurs to 
roughing up a fellow narcotics officer on a federal task force, violent 
arrests, and off-duty police assaults on Black and Brown residents of 
the city.  The tenor of the inquiry can be observed in the legal and 
public scrutiny of a particularly notorious narcotics officer, Gregg 
Bigda, accused of multiple civil rights violations that were captured 
on video.  This incident led federal Judge Michael A. Ponsor, who 
presided over a lawsuit involving Bigda, to remark that he had “seen 
videos of really violent arrests, and this got to me.”42  As of this 
writing, the U.S. Justice Department investigation into civil rights 
abuses by Springfield police officers continues.  And, despite some 
significant settlement agreements for plaintiffs, local civil rights 
leaders complain that the underlying issue in Kibbe—establishing 
 
40.  Id.  Justice O’Connor authored a concurring opinion, signed by Justices Scalia 
and Kennedy, that also registered dissent on the narrower question of whether a remand 
of the case was needed.  Id. at 393–94. 
41.  Laura Crimaldi & Shelley Murphy, ‘I Could Crush Your [expletive] Skull and 
[expletive] Get Away With It.’ A Deep Look at the Springfield Police, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 
1, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/09/01/springfield-police-facing-civil-
rights-probe/m7xG6NUxwFZ2o0gQwPqHVN/story.html. 
42.  Id. 
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municipal accountability to deter future misconduct—remains the 
issue.43 
Bridgette Baldwin, the third Kibbe panelist, posed the following 
important question at the opening of the symposium: [W]hat 
accounts for the violations of civil rights and deaths of Eric Garner, 
Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, and other Black and Brown citizens 
victimized by police misconduct?44  Professor Baldwin’s answer, a 
trenchant socio-legal analysis, is included in this symposium issue.45  
Her essay examines the role of implicit bias of state actors—only 
marginally cognizable under current legal paradigms—and the over-
criminalization of communities of color as contributing to the 
intersection of racism and police misconduct that gave rise to the 
Black Lives Matter movement.46 
These insights should be considered in light of the Kibbe case 
and the development of the Supreme Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence.  
As Terry Nagel noted, what “often happens when the Court gives the 
powerless a tool, they almost immediately begin chipping away at 
the tool, so that the power becomes less and less.”47  This 
symposium issue is dedicated to the issues brought to national 
prominence by the Black Lives Matter movement and the efforts 
underway across the globe and around the world to provide the 
powerless with legal tools to confront the many forms of racial 
injustice that we continue to face. 
 
43.  Id. 
44.  See generally Baldwin, supra note 3. 
45.  Id. at 442–46. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 4 (Oct. 
20, 2017) (on file with author). 
